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It is widely acknowledged that condoning the wrongdoing of others can itself be worthy of moral blame. Accusations of someone's condoning the wrongdoing of others have become relatively common in public discourse. But it is not always clear what exactly is meant by these accusations or how the alleged condoning of others qualifies as morally blameworthy. I attempt to shed some light upon the notion of condoning wrongdoing, to contrast it with other related moral concepts, to explore the manner in which it can qualify as morally blameworthy, and to argue that in some instances it is not actually blameworthy.
How to Cite
Mellema, G. (2020). Condoning Wrongdoing. Humanities Bulletin, 3(2), 120–126. Retrieved from https://www.journals.lapub.co.uk/index.php/HB/article/view/1673
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