On the Applicability of the Semiotics of Passions in Images

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Abstract:
Recent research in semiotics has foreseen analyzable units on the basis of the context instead of the text. In addition to language-based and psychologically-based semiotics (Saussure 1959), today semiotics has introduced the epistemological grounds on visual signs as well. My aim in this paper shall be to introduce the acting subject into such a context, which in my opinion can transform the states of visual expressions, as shown in their various shapes, from one to another. In such a context I shall exemplify the applicability of the subjectivized objects for the purpose of interpreting images (exemplifying thus concrete works of art) which can produce passions as semantic results (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993). The questions which I advance shall be the following: how can such passionate taxonomies, transformed into feelings and seen as feedback information, interact socially? And due to the openness of the work of art, as Eco (1962) claims, where do the limits of visual artistic expressions’ interpretability lie?

Keywords: semiotics; passions; images; interpretation; meaning

Introduction
Treating relational issues based on social and cultural contexts, as well as their comparative and representational results aimed at decent interpretative possibilities, has always been a challenge for a semiotician. Depending on the view and methodology one takes as an example, semiotics today has shown an attempt to overcome many of the different theoretical views, thus trying to establish a decent application framework that would otherwise aim towards a meaningfulness of its deduced units. Owing to the fact that each approach should contain its justifiability and/or skepticism – as rightfully shown in modern epistemology [as for instance, explained in: (Goldman 1986)] – a scholar should present at least some of the reasons to search for a determined method for a certain approach, such as the following:

1) Relations and correlations have long ago pushed semioticians to detect the exact instances of the dichotomy optionality, so as to establish what one may call structure;
2) Having overcome structures and/or the structural method, a semiotician concludes that not just one discipline may be semiotically covered;
3) The micro-units opposed to macro-units [such as explained in: (Eco 1968)], which emerge from structures (be they narrative or non-narrative), can have a multifold semantic specter,
which allows the analyzable transformational units to be seen within their imprecision instead of their precision.

The discussion of the text and/or context relationship has established new realities within the semiotic methods; these have, expanded semiotics’ domain, thus enabling it to be applicable in many social phenomena. Socially minded contexts thus cover such expressions as, for instance, artistic ones, be they expressed in a textual or a non-textual way, grounded on a variety of psychological processes. In addition, one may establish different semiotically analyzable concepts, to enable the changeability of a semiotic phenomenon, from a signifying one to a conceptualizing one. Perceiving different kinds of contexts as part of artistic expressions definitely covers the visual expression and/or the visual arts themselves, as well as their expressivity in concrete issues. The questions that a semiotician would answer in relation to the mentioned contexts are of the following manner: how should one intend such seen or visualized context in order to produce text? How can unseen or undisclosed structures, intended in the shape of “absent structures” [see: (Eco 1968)], transform themselves into explicit structures, to show relational attitudes and/or narration? Besides, can such entities as an image or a process of its visualizing bring to the transformability of states from one to another?

My aim in this paper is to introduce the acting subject in the frames of the mentioned context, which can transform the states of visual expressions from one to another. Basing myself upon such theoretical grounds, I shall try to exemplify the applicability of the subjectivizing objects (and/or acting subjects) for the purpose of interpreting images that can produce passions as semantic results (see: A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993).

This paper asserts that it is semiotics that is primarily concerned with the process itself, taken either from the aspect of its linguistic conceptualizing or from the aspect of its contextual perceiving. The question that theoretically should be advanced is the following: how can visual representations (among other semiotically treatable issues) become narrative? In addition, why should they be narrative, to become passionate? Moreover, how can deduced passionate feelings socially interact as feedback information, and where do the limits of the visual arts’ interpretability lie?

On a possible methodological approach

In order to have a clear-cut picture of the possible discussable methodologies, one should bear in mind that a wider theoretical elaboration is required. To be precise, this is meant in the sense that one of the analytical methodologies should be a part of the deduction possibilities of determined semantic units. One can think of the Russian Formalists [see for instance: (Beker 1986), as well as of the Greimasian models of the trajectory of deducing meaning, see: (A. J. Greimas 1973; A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993)]. My reasons for this choice are the following: first, through the Russian Formalists, semiotics could also analyze the works of art as an object of analysis. Their initial division into form and content [seen as a binary opposition, which has earlier existed in other shapes, as for instance represented by linguistically based semiotics, see: (Saussure 1959)], enabled that a formal
analysis be performed, as opposed to the content’s aspects of a work of art [see: (Beker 1986; Ivič 1970)]. Except for this division, which later was widely applied [such as in the field of literature and folklore; see for instance: (Chatman 1978)], distinctive features could be disclosed, which in turn brought about knowing and cognizing the semantic micro-universe, in the sense of the decomposition of its constituent parts [my paraphrase; see: (Innis 1985)]. Formalizing a microstructure into smaller units, one can easily determine what is semantically relevant and what is not. In conclusion, semiotics in this sense of analysis can provide for the redundancies’ reducing processes, to the extent it is semiotically possible (with a sole aim of deducing meaning).

Second, the other analyzable methodology is based on Greimasian models. Basing thus semiotics upon discursive and epistemological grounds, Greimas and Fontanille (1993) have produced a systematic paradigm for the deduction of meaning. According to such a paradigm and/or theoretical hypothesis, and alongside the earlier-established narrative structures [such as explained in: (Greimas 1973)], such units, aimed at perceiving of, conceptualizing and finally adding the meaning component into them, have become transformable, thus producing different levels of semantic results.

In this context, one may advance the following question: how then can one apply such a methodology within what one visualizes? Is it, in the semiotic sense of the word an object, or a subject under analysis? Semiotically speaking though, one can treat phenomena as either objects or subjects. I aim to treat the mentioned phenomena simultaneously in this paper, trying thus to show the applicability of the semiotics of passions [as shown in Greimas and Fontanille (1993)]. Enacting a semiotics of action, through a subject of doing, proves the application method of the mentioned theory. As has been observed:

> It is not therefore surprising that the best-explored, and perhaps the most efficient, level of the generative trajectory is, in fact, situated in the middle area between its discursive and epistemological components. We are referring, above all, to the modeling of narrativity and to its actantial organization. The concept of an actant, freed from its psychological frame and defined only by its doing, is the sine qua non condition for developing a semiotics of action. (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993, XVI-XVII)

If semiotic phenomena are seen as objects on one hand, then they are themselves moveable (and/or transformable) as such, in the sense of describing and/or re-telling facts of different kinds. They are therefore narrative or, in another sense of the word, readable. The term of the “readerly” itself (Barthes 1992), is of a semiotic nature. Conceptualizing such an imprecision in terms of the text as a whole, one can apply the same feature to a visual expression. It is exactly such a readability that I am interested in.

If they are seen as subjects, on the other hand, then they contain the subjectivizing component (out of the objective external reality), and they finally become moveable and interpretable by way of enacting semiotic processes. The mentioned component enables such phenomena to show an action, as rightfully described by Greimas and Fontanille (1993), therefore
enabling the *active subject* to produce, a passion taxonomy by way of utilizing the “modality in action” and the *subject of doing* [italics are mine] as tools towards the explicit results of deducing meaning.\(^1\) As Gremials and Fontanilla (1993) observed

At a deeper level, the narrative subject’s semiotic doing is reduced to the concept of transformation – that is, a sort of abstract punctuality, emptied of meaning and producing a break between the two states. Narrative unfolding can hence be considered as a segmentation of the states, defined only by their “transformability”. (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993, XVII)

The term “moveable”\(^2\) and/or transformable itself, as shown in the citation above, is of interest to a semiotician because it is in this way that such a phenomenon can be subdued to a multiple meaning’s choice, a choice that is semiotically produced from the layers of the different meanings. If such a hypothesis is taken to be true then one might ask: what is objective or objectivity in terms of artistic expressions? If this is one of the conceptualizations of the visual expressions, then one can definitely justify the “epistemological and discursive level” (p. XVI-XVII) mentioned above, as well as the action and/or subject component, as it is foreseen by the semiotics of passions.

**What is a visual expression?**

A fundamental question should be advanced: is everything that we see a visual experience? Is it a psychological process, or just a result of what we have experienced? Both terms as may be concluded belong to the psychological ground. Experiencing a context is a process that one generally performs. The difference, however, lies in the following: some of the mentioned processes may be inherited, whereas some others may be acquired. Such a conclusion is a truth for all human behavioral patterns \(\text{[see: (Piaget 1969)]}\(^3\), be they communicative, emotional, creative etc. It is also true, however, that visualizing belongs specifically to psychology or, perhaps it is better to state that it is a process which we physiologically and organically possess. If one makes such a hypothesis scientifically confident, then it should belong to a precise informational processing (even from the neurobiological viewpoint), and therefore to semiotics (if one conceptualizes it in the frames of its communicational and informational level).\(^4\) Science can conceive such a vision, specifically in terms of unequivocal messages \(\text{[as explained in: (Eco 1976),]}\) that can be foreseen in different social contexts of analysis.

How does semiotics perceive a visual expression of an artistic nature? Images, photographs, social media, can be numbered within instances of visual expressions. The question then, as to whether such an expression contains the aesthetic value or not, depends on those who experience such a vision, or better: on those who interpret it.

There are two issues to discuss here, out of the semiotic viewpoint: one, the expression itself (which is the text), and second, its meaning (which at this instance should be deduced from its context). The uniting of the two components is what has to be seen as a process of semiosis.
Another question follows: how can one convince the audience of a certain expression, so as to make it artistic? Be it a text, an image, a video expression using technology, or any other issue (as we said either an object or a subject), it has to provide for its being observed, being seen, or being analyzed. A semiotician should insist on such a dichotomy: the first one being the process, and the second one the result (with, of course, the first one belonging to psychology5, and the next to the logics of science6).

As we can conclude from the aforementioned, a semiotic discourse regarding visual artistic expression specifically in this context can have a twofold nature: the first one has to compare, contradict, or concord, and the second one has to represent. If such a theoretical paradigm of a twofold conceptualizing of the semiotic objects has to be overcome, then a multifold meaning deduction is required, which is a process that lies on cognitive as well as on epistemological grounds.

**Exemplifying a visual expression**

Besides the human ability to visualize through one’s innate biological and organic capabilities, contexts can be lived, told, narrated or retold, [see: (Griffin 2003, 72-3)] in many ways. These do not necessarily have to duplicate reality but may contain imaginative and creative elements: “stories lived are the co-constructed actions that we perform with others. Coordination takes place when we fit our stories lived into the stories lived by the others in a way that makes life better. Stories told are the narratives that we use to make sense of stories lived”. [italics, quoted from the original:(Griffin 2003, 71)]7. This conclusion, in fact, explains also a semiotic discourse within, which can be thus explained: first, the realistic seen (and/or experienced) “picture” of a semiotic object (an image at our instance), and second, the way in which one describes an image. Both “psychological actions” if seen united (or as one), as I may be encouraged to call them, enact a semiotic process that (in the case of our discussion) still has to be resolved.

Fig. 1 ‘We Miss You!”, Fahredin Spahija.
The first example we are interested in is a photograph, taken by a photographer. Women are seen in the photograph: showing another smaller photo, where some young children are visible. The photograph has its title: “We miss you!” Who misses whom? Which is the undisclosed message intended by this photographer? In order to conclude such an issue, one has also to present the “pre-expressive” stage of the artist’s work, which I shall name here contextual circumstances. [See: (Eco 1968, 1994a), italics mine].

The second example is also a photograph taken from the work of the same photographer. A child’s face is visible with both of his hands: meanwhile, another hand holding his head can be seen, which presumably is in movement. It has a title too: “Life is sweet!” Does this young boy want to transmit a message, or does he show an emotion? Is it a concrete situational issue, or just a reaction to someone or something he may have seen? I shall try exemplifying the applicability of the semiotic method simultaneously in the frames of both examples.

Fig. 2 “Life is Sweet!”, Fahredin Spahića.
There is no question that such examples can also be interpreted from an existential point of view. Searching for the existence of the non-existence, (through previously established “pre-existential signs”) (Tarasti 2000) may also in this respect represent a semiotically-analyzable paradigm. Issues, however, should be methodologically presented in a gradual process of their analyzing. Here is the explanation for the first example.

After the bombardment of the territory of Serbia in 1999, many houses were emptied, many inhabitants were gone, and a refugee crisis was created. Such a situation caused the ex-Yugoslav Province of Kosovo to change its structure in architectonic, demographic, infrastructural, and linguistic terms, among others.

Many people were killed at that time. Such a crisis (and/or conflictual situation in the mentioned geographical area) had especially been intensified after the Serbian suspension of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. In the frames of the war crisis we are discussing, understandably many people who were killed were buried elsewhere, in mass graves. Consequently, people—indeed, family members and relatives—could not find the graves of friends or loved ones.

The photograph that we are dealing with shows women sitting down and protesting in front of the Government, as one may suppose. In a smaller photograph, one of them has in her hands, we see some children. Why do we see the children there? Do they want to transmit a message to the viewer?

Such a state of affairs as shown in this photograph remained unchanged for years, as it did not depend on the contexts shown or perceived, but rather, on other matters that belonged to other related contexts. An example of these contexts would be the impossibility of the local government to help people who were in desperate need, and the unwillingness of the Serbian government to undertake actions to resolve such an issue on a humanitarian basis. A relation of contradictoriness [see:(Gremials 1973)] between the two is more than obvious. One can notice a lack of meaning in case issues that are perceived at this level. In order to create a relational attitude, actantial relations should be established. It should be understandable here, that each part or each actant in this “story” told by the photographer, has and/or holds its own narrative element (or, semiotic-ally expressed, narrative structure).

Our second example represents a complex situation. Differing from the first one, which may represent a generally known context, especially for the ones that have “lived’ it, the second one may be said to represent a human state of emotionality. Here the semiotic preconditions are already created, owing to the fact that a subjective reaction is visible. Is this boy struggling for something? In my opinion, the context may be disclosed: a counter-emotion based on some sort of a stimulus, which in this instance can have a twofold nature: one, which is owed to an automatic reaction (due to a physical stimulation, which may have been performed unconsciously), and the next owed to a conscious reaction (performed in an emotional response towards what realistically the boy might have experienced). Such a relational attitude, in terms of both reactions opposed to one another.
creates a semiotic process which at this stage, relying on hypothetical grounds (as it still relies on levels of abstractions), represents a lack of meaning in the frames of the deep structure.

Naturally, the application process is not yet performed at this stage, either in the first or in the second cases. As we shall see, a process of transformation has to follow, so that such a situation becomes moveable, as well as presentable within the surface structure. Yet one may ask: why should such a visual expression become “moveable”? By this term, except for the foreseen processes of transformation, I intend the gradualness of “becoming”, i.e., the changeability from one level to another (in terms of approaching the meaning units).

As we shall see, the transformation that makes the visual expression moveable is due to the necessity of establishing and/or introducing an active subject. It is semiotics’ task to provide for determined procedures to deduce meaning, which, understandably, in the field of arts (among other related issues) is frequently decided by determined contextual circumstances.

The mentioned “textual” presentation (and/or representation) through a photograph dependent on its contextual perceiving can certainly deduce a sense of anxiety, as one of the potential taxonomies to apply later. The mentioned “anxiety” lets us know that “a wanting to do, a wish to explain”, is what preconditions such units, thus ready to utilize the modalization process. Thus, a message that has started the way, on one hand, can be noticed, and on the other, its destination is not yet reachable. Such an established semiotic precondition [see: (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993)] entails the use of the process of modalization. Expressed another way: “the recognition of the tension that characterizes phoria enables us to envision a first representation of the generation of modalities, which presumably become; at the level of narrative syntax, and the modalization of doing and being” (p.9). The preconditions expressed in the above citation allow that a “tensitivity” notion be introduced, which would further transform itself into final meaningful units, which shall later represent their surface structure.

**Seeking for a “movability” of states**

After establishing a narrative structure (Greimas 1973), or after wishing to reconstruct events so as to reach possible narrative units [italics and paraphrasing mine], (Eco 1994b), we can find ourselves in front of a semiotic situation, which represents an object of our analysis.

The narrative structure in this context means building a story from the “stories lived and stories told” on one hand [see the citation above, in:(Griffin 2003)], whereas on the other, reconstructing events is an applicable methodology in the field of arts generally (as well as specifically) in the field of visual expressions. Basing ourselves in such methodologies, is not then true that a semiotician can utilize a wider range of interpretational predispositions? It can at least prove two semiotic preconditions as theoretical paradigms: first, that a work of art can be regarded as open, because of its “indetermination” [see: (Eco 1962)], and, second, a semiotic process can be based on epistemological grounds (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993).
Such a semiotically perceived state allows us to conclude that some of the messages are already processed within our examples, whereas some other ones still need to be processed. Methodologically speaking, we are approaching the meta-communicational level, which means that some processes need to be finalized. Such processes, undoubtedly, need to pass through determined semiotically definable stages and/or levels.

A state of anxiety, unwillingness, sadness, is more than visible in the faces of the children shown in the first photograph. The reason to draw the above conclusion lies in the fact that one sees the sitting women, as well as supposedly foresees their waiting for an answer. In a word, the sense of sensitiveness can be noticed. That concept should enact a modality in action, which in fact introduces the active subject, ready for the states’ transformability. Procedurally speaking, the situation here is in full compliance with what we explained in the previous citation [see: (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993, 9)].

In the second example, we use the strategy of reconstruction of events to establish possible narrative structures. In Eco (1994b) it is named a strategy, and it certainly represents a theoretically-discussed method to analyze narration or situations which can be a subject to inter-textual interventions and various time references (Eco 1994c). Here, though, one can use it for a possible interpretation or for penetrating into the photograph’s possible worlds [see: (Eco 1994c)]. A possible world for Eco is a “flow of events” [the paraphrasing is mine, 128]. This idea, in Eco’s own formulation, is: “Siccome alcune di queste proprietà o predicati sono azioni, un mondo possibile può essere visto anche come un corso di eventi”. (Eco 1994, 128) [Or: “because of the fact that some of this proprieties or predicates represent actions, a possible world can be also seen as a course (flow) of events”].

Interpreting a work of art, to the extent, it is semiotically possible, includes imagined states, which would assist their movement from one state to another. The reliability in the states, so as to reach the transformational point (after the peak of sensitiveness), entails the existence of the subject’s semiotic doing [the paraphrasing is mine; see: (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993)]. Such would be the way to perform the application within our second example.

Is this boy touching a glass wall? Can he not escape? Whose shadow can be seen behind him? What is the constraint behind and/or in front of him, provoking his impossibility of communication with the rest of the world? These are the preconditions for the modalization process, as described: which is a way to introduce the active or knowable subject.

What one can hypothetically presume in such a context is that the boy is “closed”, or prohibited to get out of where he is. The title of this photograph, provided by the author “Life is sweet”, is in fact in a complete relation of contradiction with what we actually see in it. In addition, one can recognize here the known contradiction between appearance and reality [see: (Eco 1994b; A. J. Greimas 1973)]. The axis of reality is represented by the “text” of this photograph; or, one might better note, by what I regard to be a semiotic object, i.e. the conscious reactions of the boy, as explained above. The axis of appearance, on the other hand, is represented by the “textual message”
of the photograph, which in essence is its title, i.e. the possible unconscious reaction of the boy, as feedback information to what he might have seen. The impossibility of avoiding the situation — as well as the gestures of the child — implies a context experienced by him, which, as the photograph shows, is not disclosed to us. Owing to this last reason, an interpretation must occur. Our semiotic comprehension enables, as we said, transformation, as well as the use of the subject of doing. Thus such a subject (which here we shall name an active subject) takes into account either the relevant contextual circumstances or the undisclosed structures (which may not be visible in the example). Taking all the elements together as well as enacting a semiotics of action with them, results in the changeability or transformational procedures or, as the semiotics of passions provides for, a transformation from the state of affairs to the state of feelings (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993).

Towards a state of feelings: some possible passionate experiences

Differing from a state of affairs, a state of feelings regards a surface structure. In other words, a subject emerges after the establishment of the relations in axes, as well as after the modalization process described above, either expressed in a semiotic square or expressed because of relational attitudes among actants. “Then it would be possible to deduce modal syntax of the passions from tensive modulations and the homogeneous interpretation can be proposed of all modalizations” (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993,17). In a word, the mentioned modalities, such as: “wanting to do”, “wishing to explain”, “wanting to become”, represent the beginning of the subject’s semiotic doing, or the process of transformation itself. That ‘someone’ and/or “something” (which) who enacts the moving process (or, semiotically, the transformation process) is, as a matter of fact, the active and/or the knowable subject. Let us now return to our own chosen examples.

I shall call an ‘active subject” the one [my emphasis] who is presumably holding and/or moving the child’s head, in the second example. This is due to the fact that, besides their modalization, subjects can be “virtualized” (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993,26). One can thus open doors to the imagined situations semiotically described, so as to produce passion taxonomy: “In other words, the so-called active subject’s being is characterized by the realization of the performance itself, a characterization that in no way bears on ‘modal competence’ proper” (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993,27). In conclusion, the active subject here shall represent the subject of doing in distinction to the subject of being, which is represented through the child’s non-verbal expressivity. Above I have called such an expression, such an emotional reaction, a state of anxiety and/or of being anxious. In such circumstances, in the frames of the reality axis (which is predominant in this example, and shall deduce its semantic units, as it belongs to the conscious child’s reactions), a contradiction may be noticed between the subject of doing and that of being, thereby bringing about a state of anxiety as a manifested semantic unit in the surface structure. This finally is ready for its transformation into a state of feelings. In order to emanate a “passional configuration” (see: A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993), one has to foresee simulacra, which means building “modal simulacra”. The deduced changeability of states, in my view, regards introducing
and/or emanating such notions, which may only be hypothesized or provided for by the semiotics of passion, thus proving its epistemological competence. In conclusion, only such kind of modeling narrativity (into decomposable chains of patterns) can bring about passion taxonomy (specifically speaking, in contexts where such structures are not initially evident). Out of such stimulation, the child transforms himself into an impassionate subject, ready for passionate experiences. Thus, if a conscious stimulus has occurred, as we suppose, then the subject of doing causes the child in the photograph to produce a lack of meaning. It looks to us as if the child were questioning: “Why do you do this to me, why can’t I be at your place?” His “wanting to do” means enabling himself to communicate with the rest of the world. The passions we can deduce in this context are envy and greed. Let us now return to our first example.

We have already established a relation of contradictoriness between the “two sides of the story”, as we explained in the first example. I shall call an axis of appearance what can be seen and/or visualized in the first example: the protesting women and the sad expression, visible in the faces of the children. I shall call an axis of reality the impossibility and/or the gradualness of the problem’s solution. In difference to the first axis, the second one is not visible to viewers of the photograph. The action element is provided by the “other contexts”, as above, which can only be hypothesized. Out of such a deep structure (as we have supposed), gradual becoming of the semantic units can be deduced. The “becoming” finally expresses an attempt of the semantic units’ establishing in this example. In conclusion, one should ask: which would then be the semiotically possible result?

To our understanding, the phenomenon, which emerges because of a determined social group’s protesting (in this instance), can only be taxonomically resolved in terms of its gradualness. This occurs in the following way: if one single relative of the protesting people has been found, it means a relief, a pleasure, within a state of anxiety, and/or expectedness, which can be seen in our first example. Therefore, anxiety, anger, hatred is what should be placed in the axis of appearance, and expectedness in that of reality. I shall call an active subject in the context of this example, the one who intermediates the return of the dead bodies to the protesting close relatives. If one has to name such semiotically perceived “active subject” it has to be clear that, within the context of the first example, the internationally significant factors in the situation (i.e. the politically intervening subjects), have to represent that notion. The situation in question, as it should be clear, remains partially resolved. In conclusion, the repetitive passions shall prevail as long as a long-term contextual solution occurs.

**Conclusion**

From both of the examples provided one can conclude that the semiotic method is definitely applicable in the field of visual arts generally, as well as within images as artistic expressions, in specific instances. One has to remark in addition that not only one single semiotic approach within the execution of the signification process is possible. This hypothesis mentioned as a final and procedural performance of a semiotic function has to be justified.
First, uniting form and meaning, as a characteristic of what used to be called “semiology” [among other related issues, see: (Saussure 1959)], shall for us represent an applicable methodology for the following fact — seen or experienced visual impressions (either conceptualized as impulses, or, parts of determined nervous synapses within human brain, or, eventually chaotic and unprocessed signs) get gradually processed. This occurs due to the communicational processes accomplished. Each seen segment is being added a meaning, representing either a result of a certain motivation or a result of a presumed factual situation. Consequently, this vision would justify the relation between the signifier and the signified.

Second, not only in terms of images (but also in other forms of visual expression), one performs determined psychological processes, but they, in turn, may be interpreted, such as was the case in our analysis. Greimas’ contribution brought about the recognition as well as the conceptualizing of the subject and the subjectivizing processes (in the frames of their “epistemological” perceiving) within the semiotic method in general. By the term “interpretation” in the context of our examples, I mean such an imprecision in terms of semantic units deducing that allows other interpretative and cognitive possibilities as processed results. This is due, above all, to the openness of the work of art, and its “indetermination”. Eco’s (1962) terming of this concept emerges from the multifold nature of conceptualizing a work of art, thus aiming at the difference, and/or differentiation of its constituent parts as a semiotic concept. It confirms the thesis that there is no such a thing as a unique or a uniform perception and/or vision of the objects and subjects around us. It is for such reasons that I consider that the chains of transformational units, aiming at a variety of semantic results, represent an omnipresence of the applicability of the semiotic method, thus as well, contributing to the “unlimited process of semiosis” (see: Peirce 1960; Eco 1962).

Endnotes:
1. These terms belonging to Greimas and Fontanille (1993) shall be explicated later in this contribution.
2. This term is mine. By “moving” from one state to another, I mean the process of transformation, not in the Chomskyian sense only, but as well in a sense of performing an action.
3. It should be observed here that Piaget implies “reading” and “interpreting” images, even at the very early stages of a child’s development: to be precise, starting from the age of 18 months.
4. It should be understandable that such a thesis can be supported by arguments such as in the case of biosemiotics. (See: Merrell 1996) As far as the motivational attitude of such signs’ processing is concerned, it may belong to an interpretative process which, in terms of the artistic process (and/or in terms of other semiotically discussable contexts), may overcome what one calls a semiotic process in terms, naturally, of their communicative competence. If issues are put on cognitive grounds, however, then interpretation as well becomes a part of the semiotic process (due to a possible multilayered meaning’s deduction, (such as explained, for instance, by Greimas, 1973).
5. Such as in linguistically and psychologically based semiotics (See: Saussure 1959).
7. The last sentence is not Griffin’s own. As quoted in the original: Pearce and Pearce: “Transcendent Storytelling”.
9. Another term used by Greimas and Fontanille (1993) is “knowable subject”.
10. Similar to the “knowable subject”, provided by Greimas and Fontanille (1993).
11. Alternatively: “modal expressions”. This term is mine, and it is aimed at explaining Greimas’s and Fontanille’s concepts.
12. For other matters related to a semiotic process resulting into a subjectivity as a philosophical concept, thus contributing to the process of semiosis, (see: Deely 2009). I distinguish between the two ways of a semiotic treatment of the ‘subject” and “object”; it is in conclusion, for these reasons that the matter here is not elaborated in details.

References: